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1.  Introduction 
Bernanke (2005) argued in his famous speech that the “savings glut” in Asia, 
most notably in China, and several European countries with current account surpluses, 
had created severe and persistent global imbalances. These imbalances have by and large 
found their way through capital flows into the U.S. economy (Caballero et al, 2008).  
Importantly, unlike capital flows to emerging markets, a large share of these flows have 
been invested in effectively risk-free assets, such as U.S. treasuries, U.S. government 
agency debt, and money market fund shares.  Some observers (for example, Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy, 2009) have argued that this demand for risk-free assets coming from 
surplus countries left the U.S. economy fragile by concentrating the real risks in its 
financial sector. Together, these observations constitute the global imbalance explanation 
of the financial crisis of 2007.
4 
We argue in this paper that global imbalances fall short of explaining why the 
financial crisis took such a global form right from its inception.  To understand the global 
spread, we analyze how financial sectors around the world became exposed to the crisis.  
We show that large commercial banks in both current account surplus and current 
account deficit countries manufactured risk-free assets by setting up asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits.  These conduits are a form of securitization in which 
banks use off-balance sheet vehicles to purchase long-term assets financed with short-
term debt.  However, contrary to other forms of securitization, such as mortgage-backed 
securities or collateralized debt obligations, banks effectively retain the credit risk 
                                                            
4 Bernanke (2009) and Portes (2009) also argue that it is impossible to understand the financial crisis fully 
without appealing to global imbalances and that they are the underlying cause of the crisis.  Jagannathan, 
Kapoor, and Schaumberg (2009) argue that imbalances in labor supply can help to explain the financial 
crisis. -2- 
 
associated with conduit assets.   Hence, as long as banks are solvent, conduits are risk-
free for outside investors but can generate significant risks for banks.  In exchange for 
bearing these risks, banks have access to low-cost funding via the asset-backed 
commercial paper market. 
We believe that ABCP conduits are an interesting laboratory for studying the 
geography of risk-free assets for two reasons.  First, before the financial crisis of 2007, 
asset-backed commercial paper was the largest short-term debt instrument with more than 
$1.2 trillion outstanding in January 2007.  For comparison, the second largest instrument 
was Treasury Bills with about $940 billion outstanding.   Second, we show that the risks 
associated with ABCP conduits were primarily borne by large commercial banks.  Hence, 
we can construct the geography of risk-taking using bank headquarters’ locations.  These 
data are not available for other safe assets such as AAA-rated tranches of securitized 
assets. 
Our analysis shows that most asset-backed commercial paper was issued in U.S. 
dollars and sold to risk-averse investors such as money market funds.  Most of the 
proceeds were used to invest in long-term financial assets of current account deficit 
countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.  However, the sponsoring 
commercial banks were based both in current account surplus countries (e.g., Germany, 
Japan, and the Netherlands) and current account deficit countries (e.g., United States, 
United Kingdom).  In fact, we find that the country-wide level of asset-backed 
commercial paper outstanding, our proxy for the scale of production of risk-free assets, 
was effectively uncorrelated with a country’s current account balance. -3- 
 
Hence, when information about the deteriorating quality of U.S. sub-prime assets 
traveled across the financial markets in the summer of 2007, it was not just banks in the 
U.S. that suffered losses. On August 9, 2007, the French Bank BNP Paribas announced 
their suspension of net asset value calculation,
5 following which risk-averse investors 
stopped refinancing maturing asset-backed commercial paper.  In fact, asset-backed 
commercial paper outstanding decreased sharply in August 2007 (see Figure 1), and the 
cost of issuing overnight asset-backed commercial paper relative to the U.S. Fed Funds 
rate increased from 10 basis points to 150 basis points within one day of the 
announcement (see Figure 2). 
The first banks to collapse and be bailed out by their government were IKB 
Deutsche Industriebank and Sachsen Landesbank based in Germany (Acharya and 
Schnabl, 2009).  These banks had provided credit guarantees more than three times their 
equity capital in order to issue asset-backed commercial paper of the risk-free variety.  
The German banks were unable to fulfill promises under these guarantees and were 
rendered insolvent.  Other large banks in both Europe and the United States, such as 
ABN Amro (eventually Royal Bank of Scotland) and Citibank, survived the decline in 
the asset-backed commercial paper market but suffered significant losses because their 
credit guarantees to outside investors required them to pay off maturing asset-backed 
commercial paper  at par independently of underlying asset values (the so-called 
“securitization without risk transfer”, a term employed by Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez 
(2009) to describe asset-backed commercial paper).  In our empirical analysis, we find 
that a one-standard deviation increase in a bank’s exposure to conduits, measured as the 
                                                            
5 See “BNP Paribas Freezes Funds as Loan Losses Roil Markets”, Bloomberg.com, August 9, 2008. -4- 
 
ratio of asset-backed commercial paper to bank equity in January 2007, reduces stock 
returns in August 2007 by 0.8 percent.   
Thus, contrary to the global imbalance explanation, we find that countries with 
current account surpluses such as Germany, Japan and the Netherlands did as badly in 
terms of bank stock returns as deficit countries like the United States and the United 
Kingdom, with Germany in fact doing the worst.  Indeed, there is no correlation between 
the extent of safe asset “manufacturing” measured by ABCP outstanding and global 
imbalances measured by current account balances. 
Instead, we conjecture based on descriptive evidence of the regulation of ABCP 
conduits across countries, that bank risk-taking was driven primarily by “weak” 
regulation in the sense that it allowed banks to hold assets in conduits with little capital 
relative to the required capital for assets on bank balance sheets.  We describe the capital 
regulation for conduits in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and 
Canada and how it affected the likelihood of banks in these countries to set up conduits. 
Lastly, we document that the inability to roll over ABCP led to “dollar shortages” 
among European banks that had sponsored conduits (Baba, McCauley and Ramaswamy, 
2009, and McGuire and von Peter, 2009).  As a result, U.S. subsidiaries of European 
banks increased their borrowing from the Federal Reserve in the United States, which 
eventually prompted the Federal Reserve to set up dollar-swap facilities with a large 
number of central banks in other countries, especially in Europe. 
Overall, our results suggest that the geography of the financial crisis depends on 
the incentives of global banks to manufacture riskless assets rather than the direction of 
capital flows.  According to the pure global-imbalance view, the financial sectors of -5- 
 
current account surplus countries should have been shielded from the financial crisis.  
Instead we observe that banks in surplus countries are at least as affected as banks in 
deficit countries.  Thus, in a world with global banking, the financial sectors of surplus 
countries are themselves at substantial risk from capital flows into deficit countries.  
In terms of related literature, Rose and Spiegel (2009a, b) document that the crisis 
does not seem to have spread through contagion from the U.S.  They document that 
countries that had disproportionately high amounts of trade with the U.S. in either 
financial or real markets did not experience more intense crises.  Our paper employs a 
nuanced version of financial exposure to the U.S. – the extent of ABCP conduit activity 
undertaken by banks in different countries – and shows that it explains performance of 
country-level and bank-level stock returns in the early phase of the crisis.  However, we 
too do not view this as a “transmission” from the U.S.; instead as a direct financial 
exposure to the U.S., that is uncorrelated with trade exposure to the United States. 
Gorton and Souleles (2005), Gorton (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), and Adrien et 
al (2010) provide descriptions of the shadow banking sector. Ashcraft and Shuermann 
(2008) present a detailed description of the process of securitization of sub-prime 
mortgages, of which conduits were one component.  Nadauld and Sherland (2008) study 
the securitization by investment banks of AAA-rated tranches – “economic catastrophe 
bonds” as explained by Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2008) – and argue that the change in 
the SEC ruling regarding capital requirements for investment banks spurred them to 
engage in excessive securitization. In contrast, Shin (2009), Acharya and Richardson 
(2009), and Acharya and Schnabl (2009) argue that banks were securitizing without 
transferring risks to end investors and, in particular, asset-backed commercial paper and -6- 
 
the purchase of AAA-rated tranches were a way of taking on tail-natured systemic risk of 
the underlying pool of credit risks.  
In an analysis that focuses on the economic causes of the financial sector’s 
increasing propensity to take such risks (in one class of conduits – the “credit arbitrage” 
vehicles), Arteta et al (2008) provide evidence consistent with government-induced 
distortions and problems of corporate governance. They also present an overview of the 
location of credit arbitrage conduits, but do not relate it to global imbalances, the focus of 
our paper.  Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009) document that ABCP was indeed risk-
free in that only 3% of losses were borne by ABCP investors.  They also illustrate the 
important role played by bank guarantees in enabling conduits to issue ABCP by showing 
that rollovers of ABCP that had weaker guarantees (“extendible notes” and “SIVs”) were 
more difficult during the crisis than those of ABCP with stronger guarantees (“credit 
guarantees” and “liquidity guarantees”).  Finally, Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009) 
document the “run” in the shadow banking sector and link it to the deterioration of asset 
quality in conduits. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the 
structure of ABCP conduits, describes the data sources, and presents summary statistics.  
Section 3 examines the role of global imbalances and country-specific financial 
regulation in setting up ABCP conduits. Section 4 analyzes the geography of ABCP in 
terms of their sponsor, their investment strategy, and their outside investors.  Section 5 
shows how the financial crisis erupted in August 2007 in different parts of the world and 
links bank’s exposure to ABCP conduits.  Section 6 provides a discussion of economic -7- 
 
incentives behind ABCP issuance and related activities aimed at producing risk-free 
assets.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background 
Asset-backed commercial paper conduits form an integral part of financial 
intermediation that has over time come to be called "shadow banking". Put simply, 
shadow banking is that part of the intermediation sector that performs several functions 
(e.g., maturity transformation which involves borrowing short and lending long) that we 
traditionally associate with commercial and investment banks, but which runs in the 
“shadow” of the regulated banks in that it is off-balance sheet and less regulated.  Adrian 
et al (2010) provide an excellent overall summary of shadow banking. We focus here on 
a few headline facts that help position the important role of ABCP conduits in shadow 
banking. 
Adrian et al (2010) document that shadow banking assets grew from an amount 
close to zero in 1980 to somewhere between $15 to $20 trillion by 2008. These include 
assets managed or owned by conduits (SIVs, SIV Lites, and other conduits such as 
securities arbitrage conduits), prime money-market funds, asset-backed securities (ABS) 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) of both mezzanine and high-grade types, enhanced 
cash accounts, and securities lending. In 2007, of the total assets newly transported to 
shadow banking, conduits represented about 25%. In terms of the "stock" of assets, as of 
July 2007, ABCP conduits held over $1.2 trillion, compared to securities lending of $0.6 
trillion, broker-dealer repo of $2.5 trillion, and financial commercial paper of $0.4 
trillion.  -8- 
 
Next, we describe the organizational structure of ABCP conduits on both assets 
and liabilities sides, and discuss how these conduits remain linked to the sponsoring 
institutions through credit and liquidity enhancements.  
 
2.1. Conduit structure 
Figure 3 depicts the typical structure of an asset-backed commercial paper conduit 
and its relation to its sponsoring financial institution, asset sellers, and outside investors.  
We describe this structure using the conduit Ormond Quay as an example.  Ormond Quay 
is a conduit set up in May 2004 and managed by Sachsen Landesbank, a large regional 
bank in Germany.  Sachsen Landesbank’s management responsibilities consist of 
selecting the assets to be purchased by Ormond Quay and issuing short-term asset-backed 
commercial paper in order to finance the assets.  Sachsen Landesbank sells the asset-
backed commercial paper to outside investors, such as money market funds, and rolls 
over the asset-backed commercial paper at regular intervals.   
Panel A of Table 1 shows the composition of Ormond Quay’s investments by 
asset type as of July 2007.  Ormond Quay invested almost exclusively in asset-backed 
securities with a total value of $11.4bn.  The majority of the securities were backed by 
residential mortgages (55.5%) and commercial mortgages (23.8%).  The remainder was 
split between corporate loans (4.1%), consumer loans (4.1%), collateralized debt 
obligations (2.7%), and a mix of equipment lease receivables, car loans and leases, 
student loans, credit card receivables, and other asset types.  As shown in Panel B of 
Table 1, the majority of Ormond Quay’s assets were originated in the United States 
(37.7%) and the United Kingdom (22.1%).  The remainder was split between unspecified -9- 
 
countries in Europe (11.2%), Italy (9.3%), Spain (8.4%), Netherlands (3.9 %), and other 
European and Asian countries.  All assets had the highest “AAA” rating from at least one 
certified credit rating agency. 
On the liabilities side, Ormond Quay financed the assets almost exclusively by 
issuing short-term asset-backed commercial paper.  As of July 2007, total asset-backed 
commercial paper outstanding was $12.1 billion of which 32% were issued in U.S. 
dollars and 68% were issued in Euro.
6  We estimate that Ormond Quay only had a sliver 
of equity, around $36 million, or 30 basis points of its asset value.  There were no other 
liabilities.  We have no information on Ormond Quay’s hedging strategy but, like most 
conduits, Ormond Quay’s is likely to have hedged its currency risk and interest rate risk. 
Ormond Quay benefits from a credit guarantee provided by Sachsen Landesbank 
which guarantees that Sachen Landesbank pays off maturing asset-backed commercial 
paper if Ormond Quay is unable to do so.  Hence, as long as Sachen Landesbank is 
solvent, outside investors are expected to be repaid.  This structure is different from 
traditional commercial paper which is considered safe because of its seniority in the 
capital structure due to its short-term maturity (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2009).  Instead, 
asset-backed commercial paper is considered safe because it is backed jointly by conduit 
assets and a bank guarantee.   
As a result of the bank guarantee, Moody’s awarded the conduit the highest 
possible short-term rating “P-1”.  Moody’s also explicitly mentions in its report that the 
                                                            
6 We do not have information on the maturity of Ormond Quay’s asset-backed commercial paper but, 
according to the Federal Reserve Board, most conduits have asset-backed commercial paper outstanding 
with a maturity of 30 days or less.  The majority of issuance is with a maturity of 1 to 4 days. Regarding 
outside investors, we have no information of their identity but according to the Federal Reserve’s Flow of 
Funds, the main investors in asset-backed commercial paper are US money market funds.   -10- 
 
guarantees provided by Sachen Landesbank are required for the “P-1” rating and notes 
that these guarantees are considered sufficient because Sachsen Landesbank itself 
benefits from a grandfathered state guarantee.  The rating is important for the sponsor of 
asset-backed commercial paper because many outside investors, such as U.S. money 
market funds, have regulatory constraints which require them to buy only highly-rated 
securities (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2009). 
  The structure of Ormand Quay is typical for asset-backed commercial paper 
conduits.  Most conduits, with the exception of Structured Investment Vehicles, are 
financed almost exclusively with asset-backed commercial paper.  Also, most conduits 
benefit from a credit guarantee provided by a large commercial bank which guarantees 
them Moody’s highest short-term rating (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2009).  Unlike 
Sachsen Landesbank, most sponsors do not have an explicit state guarantee, but they are 
typically large enough such that they are considered very unlikely to fail.  Also, many 
sponsors may benefit from implicit too-big-to fail guarantees by their respective 
governments. 
 Like  Ormand Quay, most conduits invest in “AAA”-rated securitized assets, un-
securitized assets of similar quality, or a combination of both.  Ormand Quay is a credit 
arbitrage conduit, which is a type of conduit that invests almost exclusively in securitized 
assets.  Other types of conduits are multi-seller conduits or single-seller conduits that 
usually invest in unsecuritized assets.  In the case of multi-seller conduits and single-
seller conduits (sometimes also called loan conduits), a large share of the assets are 
bought from customers of the sponsoring financial institution.   -11- 
 
Regarding asset types, many conduits invest in mortgages but not all conduits do.  
Other common asset types are trade receivables, credit card receivables, student loans, 
auto loans, home equity loans, corporate loans, and consumer loans.  Most conduits are 
diversified across several asset classes.  Regarding investment strategies, credit arbitrage 
conduits tend to invest more in long-term assets such as mortgages, whereas multi-seller 
conduits and single seller conduits tend to invest more in medium term assets such as 
trade receivables.   
Overall, conduits are similar to regular banks in the sense that they hold long-term 
and medium-term risky assets and finance themselves via issuing short-term debt.   
 
2.2 Data 
We use several data sources for the empirical analysis in this paper.  The primary 
data sources are conduit ratings reports from Moody’s Investor Service covering the 
period from January 2001 to March 2009.  The rating reports are typically three to five 
pages and contain information on conduit sponsor, conduit type, conduit assets, credit 
guarantees, and a general description of the conduit.  Moody’s Investor Service publishes 
the first report when it first issues a rating and subsequently updates the reports at regular 
intervals.  For some conduits, Moody’s Investor Service publishes monthly monitoring 
reports.  Monthly reports are typically one page and comprise information on conduit 
size, credit guarantees, and conduit assets.  In addition, Moody’s Investor Service 
publishes a quarterly spreadsheet that summarizes basic information on all active 
conduits. -12- 
 
  To construct our data set, we start with the universe of conduits collected by 
Moody’s Investor Service.  We merge conduits that have more than one funding 
operation (79 out of 9536 observations).  We drop South African conduits because they 
are rated on a different scale (72 out of 9536 observations).  We drop ABCP issued by 
collateralized debt obligations because the credit guarantees for collateralized debt 
obligations are different from the credit guarantees provided to conduits (292 out of 9536 
observations).   
For each conduit, we identify the sponsor and match the sponsor to the 
consolidated financial company (e.g., we match Deutsche Bank New York to Deutsche 
Bank in Germany).  We use several data sources such as Bankscope and Osiris to identify 
sponsors.  Once we identify a potential match, we verify the information using the 
company website. 
We match sponsors to sponsor characteristics using the Bankscope database.  We 
use the ISIN identifier to match Bankscope data to stock return data from Datastream.  If 
a bank does not have an ISIN identifier, we verify with the company website that the 
bank is not listed on a stock exchange.  We use the headquarters of the consolidated 
financial company to identify the location of the sponsor. 
 
2.3. Summary statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all conduits authorized to issues ABCP as 
of January 1, 2007.  Panel A shows that there are 296 conduits with total ABCP 
outstanding of $1.235 trillion.  The average conduit size is $4.2 billion with a standard 
deviation of $5.2 billion.   The largest conduit type is multiseller conduits with $548 -13- 
 
billion in ABCP.  Multiseller conduits purchase assets from more than one seller.  The 
assets are often not securitized and the sellers are usually clients of the conduit sponsor.  
The main asset types held by multiseller conduits are trade receivables (15%), securities 
(12%), auto loans (11%), credit card receivables (10%), and commercial loans (9%). 
The second-largest type is credit arbitrage conduits with $213 billion in ABCP.  
Credit arbitrage conduits usually purchase securitized assets from many sellers.  The 
main asset types held by credit arbitrage conduits are residential mortgage loans (26%), 
collateralized loan obligations and collateralized bond obligations (21%), commercial 
mortgage loans (12%), and commercial loans (11%). The third-largest type is single-
seller conduits with $173 billion in ABCP.  Single-seller conduits are often used by 
mortgage originators to warehouse assets before they are securitized. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics per sponsor.  We define a sponsor as a single 
consolidated financial company and we aggregate ABCP at the holding level.  In total, 
there are 126 sponsors with average ABCP outstanding of $9.8 billion. The largest 
sponsor type is commercial banks.  Commercial banks sponsor $903 billion, or 73%, of 
ABCP.  The second largest group is structured finance groups with $181 billion in 
ABCP.  Other sponsors are mortgage lenders ($71 billion), insurance companies and 
monoline insurers ($14 billion), and investment banks ($11 billion).  
 
3. Understanding the geography of asset-backed commercial paper conduits 
As explained at the outset in our introductory remarks, the global imbalance view 
of the crisis attributes the financial crisis to the fragility of the financial sector in the 
United States as it faced a pressure to meet the persistent and heightened demand for -14- 
 
“safe” assets from the rest of the world, most notably from surplus countries such as 
China.  A pure global imbalance view – based primarily on the direction of capital flows 
– would suggest that other than through an indirect exposure to the U.S. financial sector 
(for example, through inter-bank linkages or complementarities across countries in trade), 
surplus countries should not have been exposed to the fragility of the U.S.. 
Some researchers (for instance, Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2008)) view 
the large and persistent global imbalances as an efficient outcome of the financial 
integration in which advanced financial markets accumulate foreign liabilities as a 
gradual process concomitant with their (further) financial deepening, resulting in sizable 
welfare gains for developed countries. 
More recent accounts of the global imbalance view, such as in Caballero (2009), 
do attribute the financial crisis to the insatiable demand for safe debt instruments that put 
an enormous pressure on the U.S. financial system, but recognize that the system caved 
in to this pressure due to poor design of incentives and regulatory mistakes in the 
financial sector.  
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) argue that both global imbalances and the financial 
crisis are rooted in common causes linked to economic policies adopted in several 
countries such as the low-interest rate environment in the United States and the 
undervaluation of its currency by China.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001, 2005, 2007) also 
note the systemic risk imposed to the global economy due to untested developments in 
financial markets during 2000s.   
In contrast, we contend that it was lax financial sector regulation in a world with 
global banking that contributed to the fully global nature of the crisis right from its -15- 
 
inception.  In particular, we argue below that weakly regulated financial sectors – of both 
capital surplus and deficit countries – expanded rapidly by taking in capital flows into the 
U.S. and creating assets in the U.S.  Hence, when the U.S. assets experienced 
deterioration in 2007, the geography of the crisis was determined by global banking 
flows. That is, it was determined on the basis of which financial sectors were weakly 
regulated – and thus allowed to build significant leveraged exposure to the U.S. assets – 
rather than by the global capital flows, as predicated by the global imbalances view of the 
crisis. 
 
3.1. The role of financial sector regulation  
There is considerable variation across countries in their regulatory treatment of 
ABCP conduits.   One important component of regulation in all countries is the 
distinction between credit enhancement and liquidity enhancement.  In the context of 
conduits, credit enhancement is an unconditional guarantee by the sponsoring bank to 
pay off maturing commercial paper if the conduit is unable to do so.  In almost all 
countries, credit enhancement is considered equivalent to on-balance sheet financing and 
therefore requires the same amount of regulatory capital.   
However, there is important variation across countries in the regulatory treatment 
of liquidity enhancement.  In the context of conduits, liquidity enhancement is a 
conditional guarantee by the sponsoring bank to pay off maturing commercial paper if 
the conduit is unable to do so.  The condition is that conduit assets are deemed 
performing when the sponsor is called upon to provide liquidity.   In practice, conduits 
usually stipulate assets as performing if the delinquency rate is below a pre-specified -16- 
 
level (unsecuritized assets) or if the assets are rated as investment grade (securitized 
assets). 
This structure of liquidity enhancement ensures that liquidity enhancement is 
effectively providing the same level of insurance to outside investor as credit 
enhancement.  The reason is that most assets in conduits are considered high quality, 
which ensures that there is a considerable time lag between the first signs of a decline in 
asset quality and the date on which assets are deemed non-performing.  Since commercial 
paper is short-term, this means that the commercial paper almost always expires before 
assets are deemed non-performing.   Consistent with this interpretation, Acharya, 
Schnabl, and Suarez (2009) find that there is not a single bank-sponsored conduit in 
which the liquidity enhancement expired before asset-backed commercial paper investors 
were repaid.   
We therefore focus on bank regulation regarding liquidity enhancement.  We 
summarize the relevant regulation regarding liquidity enhancement for the countries 
which are the main three sponsors of conduits: United States, United Kingdom, and 
Germany.  We also describe the regulations for Canada and Spain, which differ in their 
treatment of liquidity enhancement.  Finally, we summarize regulation for other 
countries. 
 
3.1.1. United States 
Before 2001, bank regulators in the United States made a strict distinction 
between credit enhancement and liquidity enhancement.  Credit enhancement was 
considered equivalent to on-balance sheet financing, resulting in an eight percent capital -17- 
 
charge for assets covered by credit enhancement. Liquidity enhancement was considered 
off-balance sheet financing, resulting in a zero percent capital charge for assets covered 
by liquidity enhancement.  Most conduits primarily used liquidity enhancement to 
provide insurance to outside investors against non-repayment of maturing ABCP, which 
resulted in low capital charges for assets in conduits relative to assets on balance sheets. 
In 2001, the energy company Enron declared bankruptcy due to fraud and 
regulators uncovered the role of Enron’s off-balance sheet vehicles in hiding Enron’s 
financial liabilities.  As a result, regulators decided to re-examine the regulatory treatment 
of ABCP conduits because conduits shared many structural features of Enron’s off-
balance sheet vehicles.   
In January 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued final 
accounting guidance on variables interest entities (FASB Interpretation No. 46 or FIN 
46), which would have required the consolidation of conduits on bank balance sheets 
under U.S. GAAP.  Industry publications around that time discussed the likely possibility 
that new regulation would require the same capital charges for assets in conduits as for 
assets on balance sheets.  Consistent with this interpretation, Figure 1 shows that there is 
no growth in ABCP outstanding during the period from 2001 to 2004. 
In October 2003, U.S. bank regulators - the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision (together, the 
"Agencies") – issued an interim ruling that permit banks that sponsor ABCP conduits to 
ignore the consolidated conduit assets for the purpose of calculating risk-weighted assets.  
In July 2004, the Agencies issued a final ruling which required banks to hold capital -18- 
 
against eligible liquidity enhancement at a 10% conversion factor.  This ruling implied 
that assets in conduits required 90% less capital than assets on balance sheets.  Moreover, 
this ruling allowed banks to leave conduits off the bank balance sheet under U.S. GAAP. 
Hence, the new regulation continued to mandate much lower capital for assets in 
conduits relative to assets on balance sheets.   As shown in Figure 1, there was a large 
increase in ABCP outstanding after the Agencies issued this ruling.  This increase 
suggests that banks interpreted the ruling as a confirmation that they could continue to 
use off-balance sheet vehicles without holding significant capital against them. 
 
3.1.2. United Kingdom 
Before 2004, the United Kingdom had the same capital regulation as the United 
States.  Assets in conduits covered by liquidity enhancement were exempted from capital 
charges.  Contrary to the United States, the United Kingdom did not revise this regulation 
after 2004.  However, there are two important developments that are different from the 
United States. 
First, in the early 2000s several UK banks started adopting new accounting 
standards based on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). IFRS does not 
recognize the transfer of assets to a conduit as a true sale in the accounting sense, which 
means that UK banks using IFRS were required to consolidate conduits on its balance 
sheet for the purposes of financial reporting.
7  However, the UK bank regulator did not 
update the rules for computing capital requirement following the consolidation under 
                                                            
7 As noted in a report by Price Waterhouse on the “Great Accounting Debate: Conduits off or on balance 
sheet under IFRS”, IFRS does not recognize the usual structure employed by U.S. banks to circumvent 
consolidation under FIN 46.   -19- 
 
IFRS.  Hence, for the purpose of computing regulatory capital, conduits continued to be 
treated as off-balance sheet even though for financial reporting purposes they were on the 
balance sheet. 
Second, in 2007 most UK banks started adopting the new regulatory framework 
based on Basel 2.  Under the standardized approach, Basel 2 mandates a 20% capital 
charge against liquidity enhancement covering assets in conduits.
 8  Hence, the 
standardized approach still maintained an 80% lower capital charge for assets in conduits 
relative to assets on the balance sheet.  However, if a conduit was holding highly rated 
assets, the absolute reduction in required capital was lower, because highly rated assets 
had lower risk weights under Basel 2 than under Basel 1.  Hence, even though the relative 
incentive to put assets off balance sheet remained significant under Basel 2, the absolute 
reduction in regulatory capital decreased. 
 
3.1.3. Germany 
The history of the regulatory framework in Germany is similar to the United 
Kingdom.  German banks were not required to hold capital against liquidity 
enhancement.  In the early 2000s, some large German banks started adopting IFRS but, 
similar to UK banks, conduits continued to be off-balance sheet for regulatory purposes 
even though they were on the balance sheet for financial reporting purposes.  Also, 
                                                            
8 Under the internal ratings based approach, the difference in regulatory capital between off-balance sheet 
and on-balance sheet financing may be even lower, because this approach is based on modeling 
assumptions which make less distinction between credit and liquidity enhancement.  In 2007, however, the 




starting in 2006 and 2007 German banks adopted Basel 2 which reduced the difference in 
regulatory treatment of assets on the balance sheet relative to assets in conduits.  
Contrary to other countries, Germany has a large number of regional banks called 
Landesbanken, which are owned by state governments.  Importantly, before 2005, 
German Landesbanken operated with guarantees by their respective state government, 
which significantly lowered their funding costs.  In 2001, the European Union decided 
that such guarantees violated EU competition law and required state governments to 
abandon state guarantees by 2005.  However, all debt issued prior to 2005 still benefited 
from grandfathered state guarantees until 2015.  As a result, many Landesbanken issued 
debt before 2005 in order to raise financing at low funding costs.  
Apparently, many Landesbanken chose to invest these funds into conduits.  As 
discussed above, the grandfathered state guarantees were of critical importance in the 
ratings agencies’ assessments whether Landesbanken could support conduits.  Due to the 
guarantees, Landesbank were able to take on significantly more conduits assets relative to 
their size, which resulted in significantly higher exposure to conduits.   This was the 




  The regulation in Spain with respect to IFRS and Basel 2 was similar to the UK 
and Germany.  Contrary to the other countries, however, in the early 2000s, the Spanish 
banks regulator decided to require an 8% capital charge against assets in conduits.  
Reportedly, the regulator was worried about a domestic housing boom and wanted to -21- 
 
prevent Spanish banks from taking on additional exposure via conduits.   As a result, in 
Spain there was effectively no difference in capital requirements for assets on balance 
sheet and assets off balance sheet. 
  Interestingly, we find no exposure of Spanish bank to conduits.  This observation 
is consistent with lower benefits from conduits in Spain due to this regulation.  However, 
we observe that one Spanish bank, Santander, had exposure to conduits via its wholly-
owned UK subsidiary Abbey National plc.  It is not possible to determine whether the 
Spanish regulator required capital against conduits sponsored by Abbey National but, if 




  Before 2004, bank regulation in Canada was similar to the United States.  If 
support to conduits was structured via liquidity enhancements, the bank was not required 
to hold any capital against the conduit.  In 2004, the Canadian bank regulator, the Office 
of the Superintendant, introduced capital charges for banks that had used standard 
liquidity enhancements.  However, the Office of the Superintendant suggested that 
financial institutions can structure liquidity enhancements such that they are only paid out 
if there is a general market disruption.  These “Canadian-style” liquidity enhancements 
did not require a capital charge. 
  As a result, most Canadian conduits adopted the new Canadian-style liquidity 
enhancement.  In response, the international rating agencies Moody’s and S&P decided to 
leave the Canadian market (i.e., not rate any Canadian ABCP) because the Canadian--22- 
 
style liquidity enhancements were insufficient to safeguard outside investors.  However, 
the local rating agency Dominion Bond Rating Services continued to rate Canadian 
issuances. 
  At the start of the financial crisis in 2007, many Canadian conduits experienced 
difficulties in issuing ABCP.  Some Canadian banks decided to provide liquidity, either 
because they determined that they were legally required to do so or because they wanted 
to protect the franchise value of their conduits.  However, some banks did not provide 
liquidity with the argument that the crisis did not qualify as a general market disruption.  
Hence, there were two groups of conduits.  The first group defaulted on their ABCP, 
which triggered significant losses for outside investors, such as Canadian money market 
funds.   The second group of conduits restructured their liquidity enhancement according 
to U.S. rules and managed to remain in the market. 
 
3.1.6. Other countries 
  To the best of our knowledge, most other countries had similar regulations as the 
United Kingdom and United States.  Under Basel 1, liquidity enhancements were 
considered off balance sheet and bank regulators required no capital charge against them.  
Under the standardized approach of Basel 2, which was implemented in parts of Europe, 
there was an 80% lower capital charge for assets in conduits relative to assets on the 
balance sheet.   According to industry publications, the only exception to this regulation 
apart from Spain was Portugal, which may have been following Spain’s lead.  Consistent 
with this regulation, we do not find any Portuguese bank sponsoring conduits.   
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4.  Location of sponsor, investors, and asset originators 
4.1. Summary statistics 
To analyze the location of sponsors empirically, we restrict the sample to 
commercial banks.  The reason is that sponsors other than commercial banks usually do 
not have the financial strength to support conduits.  To get a sense of the potential 
selection bias from this restriction, consider the example of the Dutch Bank ABN Amro.  
In January 2007, ABN Amro directly sponsored conduits with ABCP of $68.6 billion 
outstanding.  At the same time, the rating agency Fitch reports that ABN Amro provided 
total credit guarantees of $107.5 billion to conduits.  Hence, the difference of $38.9 
billion is credit guarantees provided by ABN Amro to conduits other than its own.  
Typically these credit guarantees are for conduits sponsored by structured investment 
groups, which accounted for about 14% of ABCP outstanding as of January 2007.  To the 
best of our knowledge, conduits managed by structured investment groups are similar in 
terms of asset composition to credit arbitrage conduits sponsored by large commercial 
banks.   
 We identify the location of a sponsor as the location of the headquarters of the 
sponsoring bank.  For example, if the sponsor is Deutsche Bank New York, then we 
aggregate the ABCP at the level of the holding company of Deutsche Bank in Germany.   
The reason for this classification is that subsidiaries usually do not have the financial 
strength to sponsor a conduit.  Hence, credit guarantees provided by subsidiaries are 
usually backed, either explicitly or implicitly, by the holding company. 
Figure 4 shows the time-series of asset-backed commercial paper outstanding per 
country for the seven largest countries by ABCP outstanding.  We find that that the -24- 
 
majority of sponsors are located in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, France, Japan, and Belgium.  In all countries, ABCP outstanding increased 
significantly until August 2007 and dropped steeply afterwards.  
Independent of the sponsor location, however, we find a common strategy 
regarding the funding source.  We use Moody’s reports to identify the funding currency 
as of January 2007.  If a conduit issues in more than one currency, we separately account 
for each currency.   Table 4 reports total asset-backed commercial paper outstanding by 
the location of the sponsor and the funding currency as of January 2007.  For example, 
German banks sponsored $204 billion in ABCP of which $139 billion was issued in U.S. 
dollars, $63 billion in Euro, and $2.5 billion in other currencies.  In total, $714 billion out 
of $969 billion, or 74%, was issued in U.S. dollars.  We note that most European banks 
financed their conduits by issuing asset-backed commercial paper in U.S. dollars rather 
than in Euro.   
  Next, we examine the country of origin of assets held by conduits.  Unfortunately 
there is no comprehensive data on conduits assets’ country of origin.  However, Moody’s 
publishes monthly reports for some larger conduits, in particular for credit arbitrage 
reports, which often contain information on assets’ country of origin.  Table 5 lists the ten 
largest conduits by ABCP outstanding for which information on assets’ country of origin 
is available.  For each conduit, the table reports the sponsor location and the allocation of 
assets across countries.  We find that all conduits have a significant share of assets 
invested in U.S. assets independent of whether the sponsor is located in the United States 
or elsewhere.  For almost all conduits, investments in the United States represent the 
largest share for a single country.   We also note that most conduits invest most of their -25- 
 
portfolio in assets with the highest “AAA” ratings.  These results suggest that conduits 
invest primarily in high quality assets of current account deficit countries, in particular 
the United States and the United Kingdom.
9  However, we note that this analysis relies on 
credit arbitrage conduits only and that we have little data on assets’ country of origin for 
other conduits. 
  Finally, we examine the identity of investors in asset-backed commercial paper.  
We identify the broad investor classes using the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds.  The 
Flow of Funds aggregates asset-backed commercial paper and regular commercial paper 
which have a total value of $2.2 trillion in early 2007.   Assuming investors hold both 
types of commercial paper in constant proportions, the Flow of Funds provides 
information of the relative importance of different investor classes. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that the largest investor class is money market funds 
and mutual funds which account for $722 billion (32.6%) of the market.  Other important 
investors are funding corporations (26.4%), foreign investors (10.2%), and state 
governments (8.4%).  Relative to their size, households and non-financial corporations 
hold little commercial paper directly but they are large investors via money market funds. 
We use holdings data from iMoney Net to examine the importance of asset-
backed commercial paper to money market funds.  Panel B of Table 6 lists the 20 largest 
prime funds with non-zero holdings of asset-backed commercial paper.  The share of the 
portfolio invested in asset-backed commercial paper varies between 1% and 49% with 
                                                            
9 To validate these findings, we also consult a market-level report issued by Moody’s Investor Service 
(Moody’s Investor Service, 2007).  The report provides summary statistics on assets held by credit 
arbitrage conduits in March 2007.  Based on conduits with assets outstanding of $196 billion, Moody’s find 
that 53% of assets measured by outstanding principal amount are originated in the United States and that 




most funds investing between 10% and 30% of their portfolio in asset-backed 
commercial paper.   Overall, we interpret this finding as evidence that ABCP is an 
important asset class for risk-averse investors, such as money market funds.   
 
4.2. ABCP activity and global imbalances 
The previous section shows that conduits finance themselves primarily in U.S. 
dollars and purchase financial assets in current account deficit countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  However, the main risks associated with ABCP 
conduits remain with the sponsors, which are located in both Europe and the United 
States.  To put ABCP activity in the context of global imbalances, we examine the 
relation between ABCP activity and global imbalances using both country-level and 
bank-level data. 
We measure global balances as the current account balance in 2006.  We restrict 
the sample to banks located in countries in the Eurozone (as of 2006), Denmark, Japan, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States (excluding countries with populations 
smaller than 1 million).  We choose this sample because most large banks are based in 
these countries.  Among countries with banks that sponsor conduits, we exclude 
Australia, Canada, and South Africa because credit guarantees to conduits in these 
markets are not comparable to credit guarantees in the United States and Europe.  Among 
countries with large banks, we exclude China because Chinese banks do not sponsor 
conduits.   
Figure 5 shows the current account surplus in 2006.  The two largest deficit 
countries in our dataset are the United States and the United Kingdom and the two largest -27- 
 
surplus countries are Japan and Germany.  There is significant variation in the data 
ranging from a current account deficit of -11.1% (Greece) to a current account surplus of 
17.3% (Norway). 
Figure 6 presents total ABCP as of January 2007 relative to the current account 
balance.  The figure shows that ABCP is unrelated to a country’s current account balance.  
Thus, the fragility of a country’s banking sector, as measured by its exposure to ABCP 
conduits, is unrelated to the direction of the global imbalances.  Both banks in surplus 
countries and banks in deficit countries sponsor ABCP conduits.  To correct for the 
relative size of countries, Figure 7 shows the correlation of ABCP activity, measured as 
ABCP outstanding relative to total bank equity, and the current account balance.  We use 
bank equity to scale ABCP outstanding with the size of banking sector.
10  Again, we find 
that ABCP activity is unrelated to the current account balance.  
In order to control for bank observables in the geography of asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits, we examine the decision to sponsor conduits using the bank-
level.  We define an indicator variable “sponsor” equal to one if a bank sponsors ABCP 
conduits worth 10% or more of its equity and zero otherwise.  We choose this cutoff 
because a few banks have conduits worth far less than 10% of their equity.  However, we 
only want to identify banks as sponsors that have significant exposure to conduits.  We 
note that our results on the geography of conduits are robust to choosing alternative 
cutoffs of 0% and 50%.  
                                                            
10 An alternative measure of the size of the banking sector is bank assets.  For our purposes, we prefer bank 
equity because, as discussed above, countries vary in their financial reporting of ABCP on bank balance 
sheets. -28- 
 
We estimate the regression  
                              
where    are bank-level observables such as the share of deposits, the share of short-term 
debt, the capital ratio, the natural logarithm of bank assets, and the natural logarithm of 
equity. The variables    are country-level fixed effects for the five countries with the 
largest ABCP exposure. We restrict the sample to banks with total assets of at least $10 
billion. 
  Table 7 presents the results.  Column (1) shows that the country indicator 
variables are statistically significant at the 1% level for all countries with the exception of 
France.  Column (2) adds bank size measured as the natural logarithm of bank assets.  
The coefficient on bank size is statistically significant, which suggests that larger banks 
are more likely to sponsor conduits, but the bank size control does not affect the country 
fixed effects.  Columns (3) to (6) add further control variables such as the natural 
logarithm of equity, the capital ratio, profitability, and the share of short financed with 
deposits.  Importantly, the coefficients on the country indicator variables remain 
statistically significant and the economic magnitude of the coefficient even increases.   
Column (7) restricts the sample to banks with at least $100 billion of assets and finds 
similar results. 
  Overall, these results suggest that both banks located in surplus countries and 
banks located in deficit countries manufacture riskless assets by issuing asset-backed 
commercial paper.   These results are robust to controlling for bank-level observable 
characteristics.   
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5. Conduit Exposure and the Financial Crisis  
Our hypothesis is that banks with large conduit exposure would be more 
adversely affected by the crisis in the ABCP Market which took hold on August 9
th, 
2007, and this would be true regardless of their geographic location.  The difficulty in 
testing this hypothesis is that the financial crisis has many different aspects and ABCP is 
only one of them.  Hence, if we observe that banks with conduit exposure have lower 
returns during the financial crisis, then this result may be driven by other bank activities 
that negatively affect stock prices and are correlated with conduit exposure.  For 
example, starting October 2007, banks started taking write-downs also on their exposure 
to AAA-tranches of sub-prime assets. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, on August 9, 2007, 
ABCP investors reduced purchases of newly issued ABCP and spreads jumped from 10 
bps to 150 bps.  Therefore, in order to avoid other confounding effects, we focus only on 
the month of August 2007 when testing for the impact of conduit exposure on banks. 
We restrict our sample to the 300 largest financial institutions because only those 
institutions had the financial strength to support conduits.  We restrict our analysis to 
commercial banks based in Europe and the United States because these were the main 
sponsors of conduits.  We restrict the sample to banks with share price data and more 
than $10 billion in assets (93 observations).  We measure conduit exposure as ABCP 
outstanding relative to equity capital as of January 1, 2007.   
 
5.1 Country-level Response 
  First, we illustrate that the effect of the ABCP crisis was felt globally wherever 
ABCP exposure was high.  This can be seen in Figure 8 where we employ as the -30- 
 
independent variable the average stock return performance from August 1, 2007 to 
August 31, 2007 of all banks in a given country and as the dependent variable the average 
ABCP to equity exposure of that country’s banks.  Countries that have non-trivial 
exposures are the U.S., the UK and the France (deficit countries) and Belgium, 
Netherlands and Germany (surplus countries).  Most other countries are close to zero in 
terms of ABCP exposure. Nevertheless, there is a reasonably negative relationship 
between country-level stock price reaction and ABCP exposure. This underscores our 
main thesis of the paper that the financial crisis materialized at the very onset – in August 
2007 – also in many of the surplus countries, and that it was not just the U.S. (and the 
UK) that got affected by the production of risk-free ABCP to meet the inflow of global 
imbalances into the U.S. money market funds. 
 
5.2 Bank-level response 
  To verify that the stock price responses in August 2007 were indeed due to ABCP 
exposure, we examine the bank-level stock price response and its relationship to bank-
level exposure.  Our baseline specification is 
                                 
where    is the cumulative stock return of bank i computed over the month of August 
2007,             is bank i’s ABCP conduit exposure relative to equity,    are banks 
i’s observable characteristics (measured as of January 1, 2007) and    is an error term.   
We estimate the specification using robust standard errors to allow for correlation across 
error terms. -31- 
 
  Table 8 presents the results. Column (1) shows that a one-unit increase in conduit 
exposure reduces the cumulative stock return by 1.8 percentage points.  The cumulative 
stock return for this sample was -1.7 percentage points in August 2007 with a standard 
deviation of 4.7%.  A one-unit increase in exposure is approximately two standard 
deviations in the exposure variable or the difference between the exposure of Citibank 
(high exposure) and Wells Fargo (no exposure).   Hence, conduit exposure had a 
statistically and economically important effect on bank stock returns over this period. 
Column (2) controls for banks size with the natural logarithm of assets and the 
natural logarithm of equity.  The coefficient of interest decreases to 1.6% but remains 
statistically significant.  In Column (3), we add controls for the equity ratio and this 
coefficient remains unchanged.  In Columns (4) and (5), we add control variables for 
funding sources such as deposit funding and short-term debt funding and the results are 
again unaffected.  To test if exposure explains within-country variation in stock price 
reactions, Column (6) adds indicator variables for the country of bank headquarters.  
Again, the coefficient of interest is unaffected and remains statistically significant.  We 
interpret these results as evidence that banks with higher conduit exposure were more 
negatively affected by the ABCP crisis.  The coefficient may in fact constitute a lower 
bound of the realized impact because investors may have underestimated the severity of 
the downturn or may not have been fully aware of the (relatively opaque) credit 
guarantees provided to conduits. 
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5.3 Dollar shortages 
As discussed above, most conduits financed themselves in U.S. dollars but many 
sponsoring banks were located in European countries.  To the best of our knowledge, 
conduits usually hedge their currency exposure.  For example, if a conduit owns long-
term assets in U.S. dollars and finances the assets by issuing short-term asset-backed 
commercial paper in U.S. dollars, the conduit is considered hedged from a currency 
perspective. However, this structure exposes the sponsoring bank to the risk that the 
commercial paper cannot be rolled over and that the bank has to provide liquidity in U.S. 
dollars.  Consistent with this interpretation, the Belgium bank Fortis, a large sponsor of 
asset-backed commercial paper, states in its 2006 annual report that “the Fortis policy for 
banking activities is to hedge via short-term funding in the corresponding currency where 
possible”. 
As a result, we expect a large demand for U.S. dollar funding by European banks 
around the start of the financial crisis in 2007.   In particular, if assets held by conduits 
are illiquid or can only be sold at fire-sale prices, banks need to secure U.S. dollar 
funding from sources other than the asset-backed commercial paper market.  In fact, 
McGuire and von Peter (2009) document a significant “U.S. dollar shortage” during the 
financial crisis.  One way to measure the extent of the U.S. dollar shortage is as the total 
borrowing in U.S. dollars by European banks’ U.S. offices.   
Figure 9 shows total borrowing by European banks’ U.S. offices, measured as 
total liabilities in U.S. dollars minus total assets in U.S. dollars.  The figure shows that 
total borrowing increased significantly at the start of the financial crisis in August 2007.   
McGuire and von Peter (2009) argue that at least some of the increase in borrowing of -33- 
 
European banks’ U.S. offices was borrowing from Federal Reserve facilities to which 
several European institutions had access to in their capacity as primary dealers. This 
evidence suggests that European banks substituted financing from the asset-backed 
commercial paper with financing from the Federal Reserve.  As discussed by McGuire 
and von Peter (2009), such dollar shortages became particularly severe after the Lehman 
bankruptcy, which prompted the Federal Reserve to establish swap lines with other 
central banks, in particular in European countries. 
 
6.   Discussion: Bank Incentives to Concentrate Risks through Securitization 
  We have presented evidence that the geography of the financial crisis of 2007-09 
had more to do with banking flows rather than with global imbalances. Hence, we avoid 
reiterating the question asked elsewhere – which is what has caused the global 
imbalances and how to fix them. Instead, we ask – what incentives did large, global 
banks have to concentrate risks while deploying securitization methods such as ABCP 
Conduits to absorb the capital inflows?  We discuss a few possibilities including the 
changing nature of banking business, erosion of margins in traditional lending activity 
due to competition and securitization, risk-taking incentives induced by such erosion of 
bank franchise values, weak enforcement of capital requirements, bank size and 
government guarantees, and finally, globalization of banking.  More empirical work is 
needed in order to tease between these different possible explanations.     
To understand the surge in setting up of conduits in the period preceding July 
2007, it is useful to start with the traditional banking model. In traditional banking, banks 
held on to the loans they originated while performing the role of delegated monitoring -34- 
 
and screening on behalf of depositors (Diamond, 1984).  In modern banking, there was a 
fundamental change in that banks originated loans and then distributed them to outside 
investors.  In particular, banks began transferring financial assets, such as mortgages, 
trade receivables, consumer loans, corporate loans, and consumer loans off their balance 
sheets into separate legal entities called structured purpose vehicles (SPVs), of which 
ABCP conduits are one example. SPVs own the financial assets and issue asset-backed 
securities structured using several layers of tranches with higher tranches having priority 
over lower tranches in case of default of the underlying assets. This process of 
securitization was deemed to improve the safety of the financial system by allocating the 
financial risks to investors best able to hold those risks (Duffie, 2007).   
Financial system regulators have long recognized the benefits of securitization 
and provided incentives for financial institutions to shed risk and securitize assets. In 
practice, these incentives take the form of lower capital requirements if assets are 
securitized.  This is beneficial from the bank’s perspective, because issuing equity is 
generally costly relative to issuing debt. The downside of securitization is that it reduces 
bank incentives to properly monitor and screen borrowers relative to the traditional 
banking model (see, for instance, Stiglitz (1992)).  Indeed, Berndt and Gupta (2008), 
Dell’Ariccia et al (2008), Keys et al (2008) and Mian and Sufi (2008) provide evidence 
that securitization and credit risk transfer weakened bank monitoring incentives in the 
run-up to the financial crisis of 2007-09.
11   
                                                            
11 For example, Keys et al (2008) show that loans eligible for securitization had higher default rates relative 
to comparable loans not eligible for securitization. If outside investors are unable to assess loan quality 
properly and instead rely on information provided by banks or rating agencies, banks have an incentive to 
originate low quality loans and sell them at inflated prices. 
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However, this explanation cannot fully explain the large losses on securitized 
assets realized within the banking sector in the ongoing financial crisis.  Krishnamurthy 
(2008) shows that 39% of securitized mortgages were held on bank balance sheets as of 
June 2008.  In fact, many banks securitized assets but effectively were exposed to 
significant risk of assets after securitization (as with ABCP conduits in our paper) or 
explicitly continued to hold the risks after securitization (as with holdings of AAA 
tranches of sub-prime mortgages).
12  This suggests that reduced monitoring incentives 
only provide a partial explanation for why banks decided to originate and hold 
securitized assets. 
We conjecture that in modern banking, while securitization freed up costly equity 
capital that banks could deploy elsewhere, at the same time, banks no longer collected 
revenues from holding and managing risk, thus operating at weaker margins in their 
traditional business.  As a result, banks started to explore how to reduce capital 
requirements while still earning compensation for holding risk.  For example, in the case 
of ABCP conduits, banks sold credit and liquidity guarantees so that short-term debt 
investors in the conduits’ assets had effectively close to full, contingent recourse to bank 
balance-sheets but banks benefited from lower capital requirements in the short run.  In 
particular, if asset quality deteriorated in future, then the end investors in securitization 
vehicles would not roll over debt, a form of a “run” in the shadow banking sector, and the 
asset risks would be brought back by banks on their balance-sheets (Covitz, Liang, and 
Suarez, 2009).  
                                                            
12 E.g., a report commissioned by the Swiss Banking Regulator documents that UBS, one of the world 
largest banks by assets in 2006, actively sought to keep and purchase assets they had previously securitized. -36- 
 
This most modern banking model – which Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009) 
call as “securitization without risk transfer” - evidently violates the defining characteristic 
of securitization, namely, the transfer of credit risk to outside investors.  It is however 
consistent with banks wanting to risk shift (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or pay out 
private profits at the expense of transferring hidden debt risks on to others (for example, 
on to taxpayers, as argued by Akerlof and Romer (1993)).  Such incentives in turn might 
have arisen because of heightened competition and cross-border banking leading to a 
thinning of margins in traditional banking business (Keeley, 1990, Gorton, 2009),
13 short-
termism on part of bank management and risk-takers (Gorton and Rosen, 1995), and the 
presence of government guarantees such as deposit insurance and the too-big-to-fail 
doctrine (Arteta et al, 2008).   
Also, as stressed earlier in the paper, banks found ABCP conduits especially 
attractive as risk-free assets were created with very little capital on balance-sheet by 
providing guarantees to conduits in the form of liquidity enhancement (essentially, short-
term revolvers being rolled over to synthesize a long-term credit guarantee).  While this 
practice was legal, it was clearly an exploitation of a loophole in capital requirements 
since the accordance of such guarantees did not constitute a complete credit risk transfer 
and capital treatment of conduits should thus have been identical to on balance-sheet 
assets. Indeed, Spain and Portugal adopted national capital standards to rule out any 
                                                            
13 Stiroh (2002) shows, for example, that the component of revenues earned through interest payments by 
commercial banks in the United States has been dwindling steadily, and it has been replaced by fee-based 
income and trading revenues.  While interest and fee income is relatively stable over the business cycle, 
trading revenues are highly volatile and in fact much lower in Sharpe ratios.  This can be considered 
evidence supportive of a gradual trend in banking to engage increasingly in short-term, speculative 
activities, a phenomenon only further facilitated by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (separating 
commercial and investment banking activities) and enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 
(allowing commercial, investment and insurance activities within a single bank).  -37- 
 
preferential treatment of conduits, and had little conduit activity, whereas other regulators 
chose to allow the “regulatory arbitrage”. 
Viewed through this lens – that of global banks and bankers wanting to take 
excessive risks to transfer value away from creditors and taxpayers – global imbalances 
could in fact be considered as a catalyst or amplifier of the financial crisis of 2007-09 
rather than the root cause.    
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided evidence that while global imbalances may help to 
explain the capital flows from surplus to deficit countries, they fail to explain the 
geography of the financial crisis of 2007-09, in particular, why surplus countries such as 
Germany and their banks were as heavily involved as the U.S. banks in the business of 
creating risk-free securities and concentrating risks in the process.  We examined the 
asset-backed commercial paper conduits – one production technology for risk-free assets 
to meet the needs of U.S. money market funds – as a way of illustrating this point.   
We note that global banks may also have taken on similar risks via investing in 
other assets.  For example, some banks actively invested in AAA rated tranches of 
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations.
14  This strategy is similar 
to that of selling liquidity enhancements to ABCP conduits: banks take on highly levered 
bets on the economy because AAA rated tranches yield a premium over treasuries in 
good times and only suffer in case of an economic catastrophe. While the crisis in the 
                                                            
14 For example, the Swiss bank regulator issued a detail report on how the universal bank UBS suffered 
huge losses due to its exposure to the U.S. housing backed AAA-rated tranches. 
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ABCP market constituted the first important phase of the crisis starting August 2007, the 
losses on AAA-rated tranches took center stage beginning October 2007.   Due to lack of 
bank-level data, we are unable to provide an in-depth analysis of global banking flow 
patterns linked to AAA-rated tranches.  However, if such data become available, it would 
be important to extend our analysis and analyze whether risk-taking is uncorrelated with 
global imbalances.  To the extent possible, such an analysis should also include other safe 
assets such as U.S. treasuries and U.S. agency debt. 
We conclude that while it is useful for future reforms to take head on the issue of 
reducing global imbalances, such reforms are no panacea for ruling out global financial 
crises that seem more attributable to an increasing propensity of the global banking sector 
to manufacture tail risks (or “carry trade” style payoffs) coupled with its weak or 
ineffective regulation.  Maturity mismatch of the ABCP conduits and their effective 
recourse to sponsor bank balance sheets can be considered a canonical example of such 
propensity.  Addressing this propensity might reduce incidences of global financial crises 
even in a world where global imbalances persist.  While many reforms to the financial 
sector are being proposed, one seems most important to us:  the quality of enforcement of 
capital requirements (and not just their level). Not allowing global imbalances to find 
their way into the poorly-capitalized shadow banking world of ABCP conduits might 
have simply reversed or at least blocked the pattern of capital flows, and enabled 
financial regulators worldwide to effect a (relatively) market-based correction to the 
global imbalances.  
It is sometimes easier to guard against a disease than to eradicate it.  Global 
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 Figure 1:  Rise and Collapse of ABCP Commercial Paper 
 
This figure shows total asset-backed commercial paper outstanding in the period from January 2001 to February 2009.  The figure is based on 
aggregate data provided by the Federal Reserve Board.  The figure indicates the date of the Enron Bankruptcy (November 2001), the 





 Figure 2:  Yield on overnight ABCP over Federal Funds Rate 
 
This figure shows the yield on overnight asset-backed commercial paper over the fed funds rate from 8/1/2007 to 8/31/2008.  The figure is based 



























Figure 3:  ABCP Structure 
 
This figure illustrates the flow of funds to and from conduits.  The sponsoring bank is usually a large commercial bank that provides management 
services to the conduit and receives a fee in return.  The sponsoring banks usually also provides a credit guarantee to outside conduit investors.  
Asset originators sell both securitized and securitized assets to the conduits.  Most assets purchased by conduits are originated in the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  Conduits finance themselves by selling asset-backed commercial paper to outside investors.  The main outside investors 




 Figure 4:  Growth in bank-sponsored ABCP by country 
 
This figure shows the growth in ABCP by country based reports provided by Moody’s Investor Service.  The data is restricted to the seven largest 
countries. The data is restricted to ABCP sponsored by commercial banks and mortgage lenders. 
 

































Figure 5:  Global imbalances 
 
This figure shows global imbalance, measured as the current account balance in 2006.  The current account deficit data is from the OECD 
























Figure 6:  ABCP and global imbalances, unweighted 
 
This figure shows the correlation between global imbalances, measured as the Current Account Deficit in 2006, and off-balance sheet activity, 
measured as ABCP as of 1/1/2007.  The current account deficit data is from the OECD Economic Outlook database.  The GDP country data is 
from the OECD Statistical Database measured at current prices and exchange rates.  The ABCP data is based on Moody’s data and is restricted to 













































Figure 7:  ABCP and global imbalances, weighted by bank equity 
 
This figure shows the correlation between global imbalances, measured as the current account deficit in 2006, and off-balance sheet activity, 
measured as ABCP as of 1/1/2007 relative to total bank equity in 2006.  The current account deficit data is from the OECD Economic Outlook.  
The GDP country data is from the OECD Statistical Database measured at current prices and exchange rates.  The ABCP data is based on 







































Figure 8:  Stock Returns and ABCP from July 2007 to July 2008, by country 
 
This figure shows average stock returns for the period from July 2007 to July 2008 and ABCP exposure, measured as ABCP outstanding relative 
to bank size, per country. Stock returns and ABCP exposure are weighted by bank assets. The stock return index data is from Datastream, the 
ABCP data is from Moody’s Investor Service, and the bank data is from Bankscope. 
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Figure 9: Net borrowing of European banks’ U.S. offices in U.S. dollars 
 
This figure shows total liabilities in U.S. dollars minus total assets in U.S. dollars of European banks’ U.S. offices. The data is based on data 










































































































































































































































sTable 1:  Ormond Quay’s Asset Composition 
 
This table documents the asset composition of the asset-backed commercial paper conduit 
Ormond Quay as of July 2007.  Panel A shows the break-down by asset type and Panel B shows 
the breakdown by assets’ country of origin.  All assets held by Ormond Quay are asset-backed 
securities (with the exception of corporate, municipal and sovereign bonds).  The information is 
based on Moody’s July 2007 rating report of Ormond Quay. 
 
 
Panel A: Asset Type 
Asset Type  Amount % 
Residential Mortgages  6,298,165,721 55.5% 
 Commercial Mortgages  2,698,617,285 23.8% 
 Consumer Loans  462,789,971 4.1% 
 Commercial Loans  461,329,631 4.1% 
 Other Asset-Backed Securities  407,388,697 3.6% 
CDO/CLO 307,397,692 2.7% 
 Student Loans   268,042,174 2.4% 
 Equipment Lease Receivables  137,092,590 1.2% 
 Car Loans & Leases  136,437,223 1.2% 
 Credit Card Receivables 104,220,899 0.9% 
Bonds (Corporate/Municipal/Sovereign)  70,291,219 0.6% 
Total 11,351,773,102  
Panel B: Asset Origin 
Country Amount  % 
United States  4,276,996,597 37.7% 
United Kingdom  2,509,790,101 22.1% 
Europe 1,276,916,849 11.2% 
Italy 1,059,705,514 9.3% 
Spain 956,051,638 8.4% 
Netherlands 442,511,775 3.9% 
Germany 425,913,091 3.8% 
Australia 121,468,457 1.1% 
Portugal 69,875,241 0.6% 
Singapore 69,345,153 0.6% 
France 68,009,652 0.6% 
Ireland 41,221,246 0.4% 
Korea 19,926,998 0.2% 
Sweden 14,040,792 0.1% 
Total 11,351,773,104    
 
 Table 2:  Conduit Characteristics 
 
This table includes all conduits that were rated by Moody's and authorized to issue Commercial Paper on 1/1/2007.  We do not include conduits in 
South Africa (6 conduits) and CDOs authorized to issue Commercial Paper (35 CDOs).  ‘# Programs’ denotes the number of conduits.  ‘Size’ 
denotes total outstanding ABCP in million USD.  ‘Mean’ denotes the average size by program, ‘Std’ the standard deviation, ‘Min’ the minimum 
size, and ‘Max’ the maximum size. Conduits classified as full liquidity have liquidity enhancement covering all outstanding ABCP.  Conduits 
classified as full credit have credit enhancement covering all outstanding ABCP.   
 
      Market Total     Per Conduit ($mn) 
      # Conduits  Size ($mn)     Mean  Std.  Min  Max 
All Conduits  296  1,235,281    4,173  5,129  0  37,872 
Type                      
  Multiseller  135  547,970    4,059  4,380  0  21,415 
  Singe-Seller  63  173,549    2,755  3,964  0  18,931 
  Arbitrage  35  213,823    6,109  8,397  0  37,872 
  Hybrid  27  148,380    5,496  5,631  302  22,596 
  SIV  28  92,645    3,309  3,351  0  12,279 
  Other  8  58,914    7,364  6,323  2,373  20,337 
Currency                      
  USD  234  972,977    4,158  4,627  0  22,596 
  EURO  33  219,959    6,665  8,424  0  37,872 
  YEN  16  22,941    1,434  2,014  0  5,976 
  AUD  12  19,253    1,604  1,302  142  3,944 
   NZD  1  151     151   0  151  151 
 
 Table 3:  Sponsor Characteristics 
 
Panel A shows the characteristics of ABCP sponsors.  The analysis is based on Moody’s rating 





   Total    Average 
   # Sponsors  Size ($mn)  Mean  Std. 
All Programs  126 1,235,281    9,804  14,764 
Sponsor Type         
 Commercial  Banks  64 903,291   14,114  17,853 
 Structured  Finance  27 181,739   6,731  11,725 
 Mortgage  Lender  16 71,120   4,445  6,131 
 Insurance  &  Monoline  3 14,118   4,706  3,914 
   Investment Banks  4 11,039    2,760  2,257 
Country of Origin         
 United  States  68 488,535   7,184  14,608 
 Germany  15 204,103   13,607  11,593 
 United  Kingdom  10 195,678   19,568  17,045 
 Japan  5 40,820   8,164  10,606 
 Other    28 306,180   10,935  5,096 
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Table 4:  Sponsor Location and Funding Currency  
 
This table shows ABCP outstanding by the location of the sponsor and the funding currency.  The 
analysis is based on Moody’s rating reports as of 1/1/2007.   
 
   Funding Currency 
Sponsor Location  USD Euro Yen Other  Total 
  Belgium  30,473 4,729 0 0  35,202 
  Denmark  1,796 0 0 0  1,796 
  France  51,237 23,670 228 557  75,692 
  Germany  139,068 62,885 0 2,566  204,519 
  Italy  1,365 0 0 0  1,365 
  Japan  18,107 0 22,713 0  40,820 
  Netherlands  56,790 65,859 0 3,116  125,765 
  Sweden  1,719 0 0 0  1,719 
  Switzerland  13,082 0 0 0  13,082 
  United Kingdom  92,842 62,298 0 3,209  158,349 
  United States  302,054 0 0 2,996  305,050 
Total     714,871 219,441 22,941 12,444  969,697 
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Table 5:  Asset Allocation by Country of Origin 
 
This table shows the asset allocation and ratings for the nine largest conduits as of 1/1/2007 for 
which this information is available.  The share of “AAA”-rated assets is reported if this 





(Location)  Size  Country  Rating 
Grampian  HBOS (UK)  37.0 U.S. (70.4%), others (29.6%)  Aaa (99%) 
Amstel  ABN Amro 
(Netherlands) 
20.4 Netherlands  Aaa(99.1%) 
Scaldis  Fortis 
(Belgium) 
18.4 U.S. (51.1%), Global 
(14.9%), UK (10.1%), Spain 
(6.3%), Various (17.5%),  
Aaa (99.8%) 
Atalantis One  Rabobank 
(Netherlands) 
15.7 U.S. (40.5%), Netherlands 
(27.1%), Australia (9.1%), 
Great Britain (5.4%), 
Switzerland (2.9%), New 
Zealand (2.6%), Others 
(12.4%) 
 
Thames Asset No1  Royal Bank of 
Scotland (UK) 
17.9 UK (57.8%), U.S. (35.8%) 
Global (3.5%), Germany 
(2.5%), Spain (0.4%) 
 
Solitaire Funding   HSBC (UK)  15.4 U.S. (68.9%), UK (24.9%), 
Germany (3.3%), Europe 
(0.9%), Netherlands (0.7%), 
Australia (0.5%), Global 
(0.5%), Portugal (0.2%) 
Aaa (100%) 
Stanfield Victoria   Stanfield and 
Deutsche Bank 
(UK/Germany) 
21.9 U.S. (96%), UK (2%), 










HSBC (UK)  13.4 U.S. (62%),  UK (23%), 
Japan (3%), Germany (3%), 
Others (9%) 
  
Ormond Quay  Sachsen 
Landesbank 
(Germany) 
12.1 U.S. (38%), UK (22%), 








Table 6:  Investor Characteristics 
 
Panel A shows commercial paper holdings by investor class.  Commercial paper holdings include 
both ABCP and other commercial paper.  The analysis is based on the Flow of Funds data 
provided by the Federal Reserve Board.  Panel B shows holdings of Asset-Backed Commercial 
paper by the 20 largest prime funds with non-zero ABCP holdings.  The analysis is based on 
iMoneyNet holdings data. 
 
Panel A: Commerical Paper Holdings by Investor Class 
Investor    Holdings   % 
Money Market Funds  608.4  27.5%
Mutual Funds  114.1  5.1%
Funding Corporations  584.3  26.4%
Household Sector  187.7  8.5%
Non-financial Corporate  122.6  5.5%
State Government  186.2  8.4%
Foreign Investors  226.5  10.2%
Other Investors  186.1  8.4%
Total  2215.9   
Panel B: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Holdings by 20 Largest Prime Funds 
Fund  Assets  ABCP  % 
Fidelity Cash Reserves  89,088 12,472  14.0%
Columbia Cash Reserves/Class A  62,519 3,751  6.0%
Schwab Value Adv MF/Instit Prime  43,498 13,919  32.0%
Bear Stearns TempFund/PremierChoice  37,273 13,418  36.0%
Fidelity Instit MMF II  27,736 5,270  19.0%
Goldman Sachs FS Prime Oblig/Adm  27,113 13,285  49.0%
Morgan Stanley Inst Liq/Prime/Part  26,261 12,080  46.0%
Reserve Primary Fund/Inv II  25,622 512  2.0%
Dreyfus Instit Cash Adv/Adm  25,482 5,606  22.0%
Centennial Money Market Trust  25,106 8,285  33.0%
Columbia MM Reserves/Trust  22,923 2,522  11.0%
Federated/Prime Oblig Fund/Inst Svc  21,985 5,276  24.0%
Schwab Money Market Fund  21,634 6,058  28.0%
AIM STIT Liquid Assets/Reserve  21,460 4,507  21.0%
DWS MM Series/Premium/Cl S  19,447 194  1.0%
Citi Cash Reserves  18,891 189  1.0%
Northern Instit Divsfd Assets/Cl C  17,302 5,364  31.0%
First Amer Prime Oblig/Cl I  16,695 1,503  9.0%
Fidelity Prime Fund/Cap Reserves  16,690 3,338  20.0%
Schwab Cash Reserves  16,642 5,325  32.0%
    Table 7: The effect of bank observables on exposure to ABCP conduits 
 
This table analyzes the decision to sponsor asset-backed commercial paper conduits.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one 
if ABCP relative to bank equity is larger than 10% or zero otherwise.  The sample is restricted consolidated banks with total assets of at least $10 
billion in 2006. The country variables are indicator variable equal to one if bank is headquartered in that country and zero otherwise.  The control 
variables are the natural logarithm of assets, the natural logarithm of equity, the ratio of equity to assets, the ratio of pretax profits to equity, and 
the ratio of deposits to assets.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
 
   Dependent Variable: Indicator Variable (ABCP/Equity>10%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Assets ($bn)  >10  >10  >10 >10 >10 >10  >100 
U.S. Bank  0.226 0.288 0.279 0.280  0.262 0.272 0.394
 (0.083)** (0.071)** (0.078)** (0.078)**  (0.080)** (0.080)** (0.129)**
UK Bank  0.440 0.282 0.282 0.287  0.282 0.276 0.379
 (0.126)** (0.109)* (0.112)* (0.113)*  (0.113)* (0.113)* (0.143)**
German Bank  0.501 0.427 0.431 0.441  0.464 0.460 0.544
 (0.097)** (0.084)** (0.093)** (0.095)**  (0.096)** (0.096)** (0.118)**
Dutch Bank  0.501 0.296 0.296 0.300  0.320 0.333 0.342
 (0.194)* (0.167) (0.169) (0.170)  (0.170) (0.171) (0.189)
French Bank  0.187 -0.026 -0.027 -0.022  -0.029 -0.029 0.020
 (0.122) (0.108) (0.110) (0.110)  (0.110) (0.110) (0.123)
Log(Assets) 0.196 0.186 0.155  0.152 0.185 0.006
 (0.025)** (0.059)** (0.082)  (0.082) (0.086)* (0.193)
Log (Equity)  0.012 0.042  0.041 0.015 0.24
 (0.059) (0.080)  (0.080) (0.083) (0.181)
Capital Ratio  -0.372  -0.225 0.057 -4.769
 (0.691)  (0.701) (0.742) (3.430)
Profitability   0.436 0.454 0.248-59- 
 
   (0.373) (0.373) (0.519)
Share Deposits    0.178 0.07
   (0.153) (0.243)
 0.099 -0.895 -0.865 -0.752  -0.823 -1.052 -0.34
 (0.050)* (0.133)** (0.198)** (0.288)**  (0.294)** (0.354)** (0.871)
   
 NNYY   YYY
Observations 132 132 132 132  132 132 92
R-squared 0.138 0.386 0.386 0.387  0.394 0.395 0.412-60- 
 
Table 8: Impact of ABCP on Stock Returns at the start of the financial crisis 
 
This table shows the effect of conduit exposure on stock return in the month of August 2007.  The sample is restricted to consolidated banks with 
total assets of at least $10 billion in 2006 that have stock returns available. The dependent variable is the total stock return in August 2007. We 
measure ‘Conduit Exposure’ as bank-sponsored ABCP outstanding relative to equity.  Columns (2) to (6) include control variables for the ratio of 
short-term assets to debt, the ratio of equity to assets, log(Assets) and log(Equity).  All control variables are measured on 1/1/2007.  Column (6) 
includes country fixed effect.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
   Dependent Variable: Stock return 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure -0.018 -0.016 -0.015 -0.011 -0.012 -0.024
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.006)**
Log(Assets) -0.011 -0.044 -0.033 -0.041 -0.049
 (0.011) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.045)
Log(Equity) 0.016 0.049 0.044 0.051 0.052
 (0.013) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.045)
Capital ratio  -0.514 -0.408 -0.516 -0.757
 (0.545) (0.497) (0.485) (0.601)
Short term debt (%)  -0.149 -0.172 -0.054
 (0.046)** (0.048)** (0.059)
Deposits share (%)  -0.043 0.003
  (0.025) (0.029)
Constant -0.014 0.007 0.134 0.098 0.154 0.175
 (0.005)** (0.033) (0.135) (0.124) (0.122) (0.170)
Country FE  N N N N N Y
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.045 0.068 0.079 0.15 0.175 0.431
 